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Introduction and summary
In conducting monetary policy, policymakers find it 
useful to monitor the performance of the economy 
relative to some benchmark. For instance, the policy 
decision whether to raise or lower the short-term nominal 
interest rate might be affected by the deviations of cur-
rent inflation from policymakers’ comfort zone, of 
output from potential output, and of the real interest 
rate (current nominal rate minus expected future in-
flation) from its equilibrium value (the rate that would 
be consistent with output at its potential level). Unfor-
tunately, these benchmark concepts are not directly 
observed in the data, but can only be defined in the 
context of a specific theoretical framework. 
Over the past decade, the new Keynesian model 
has become the workhorse for the analysis of mone-
tary policy. This model departs from the neoclassical 
framework of the 1980s by assuming imperfect com-
petition in goods and labor markets and “sticky” (mean-
ing rigid or inflexible) prices and wages—neoclassical 
models assume prices and wages are flexible and ad-
just quickly. These ingredients in the new Keynesian 
model alter the transmission of fundamental shocks 
perturbing the economy and allow monetary policy  
to have temporary real effects. 
The equilibrium real interest rate is a crucial 
concept in the new Keynesian class of models. This 
rate represents the real rate of return required to keep 
the economy’s output equal to potential output, which, 
in turn, is the level of output consistent with flexible 
prices and wages and constant markups in goods and 
labor markets (Woodford, 2003; and Galí, 2008).1 Mean-
while, the difference between the ex ante real interest 
rate—the nominal interest rate minus expected infla-
tion—and the equilibrium real interest rate is defined 
as the real interest rate gap. 
In the new Keynesian model, the real interest rate 
(RIR hereafter) gap is central to the determination of 
output and inflation. Loosely speaking, if this RIR gap 
is positive, output will decline relative to potential. 
This is because people will be inclined to postpone 
spending decisions today to take advantage of higher 
returns to savings. All else being equal, a negative out-
put gap will then put downward pressures on prices and 
wages because of weaker aggregate demand. Converse-
ly, a negative RIR gap will typically be associated with 
a positive output gap, setting in motion inflationary 
forces—higher demand leads to higher prices. 
The main policy implication of this observation 
is that policymakers concerned with maintaining out-
put close to its potential level should set short-term 
nominal interest rates—the policy instrument of most 
central banks—in order to minimize the RIR gap. In 
the absence of a trade-off between stabilizing inflation 
and output, this simple policy prescription would also 
completely stabilize inflation. In practice, however, 
there may well be a trade-off between the two objectives 
of output and inflation stabilization.2 Nonetheless, the 
equilibrium RIR constitutes a natural benchmark for 
the conduct of monetary policy, and the RIR gap can 
be viewed as providing some indication of the stance 
of monetary policy (Neiss and Nelson, 2003). 
While the equilibrium RIR is theoretically appeal-
ing, its use in guiding monetary policy decisions fac-
es at least two major hurdles. First and foremost, the 
equilibrium RIR is not directly observable in the data, 
limiting its usefulness as a target for monetary policy 
in practice.3 Moreover, rather than being constant, the 15 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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equilibrium RIR fluctuates over time in response to a 
variety of shocks to preferences and technology that 
perturb the economy. 
Second, setting nominal interest rates to track the 
equilibrium RIR may not be feasible at times because 
of the existence of the zero bound; that is, nominal in-
terest rates cannot be set lower than zero. Indeed, the 
equilibrium RIR may fall enough to induce a positive 
RIR gap, even with the nominal interest rate at zero. 
Output would then decline below potential, engender-
ing deflation. In this way, the gap helps us to gauge the 
constraint imposed by the zero bound on monetary 
policy. With short-term nominal interest rates now  
at historically low levels in the United States and a 
number of other industrialized countries, this scenario 
is receiving a lot of attention from both the academic 
community and policymakers. 
Given the importance that the equilibrium RIR 
plays for the design of monetary policy in modern 
macroeconomic models, our purpose in this article  
is to provide an estimate of this unobservable vari-
able. We do so by inferring it from an empirical new 
Keynesian model fitted to U.S. quarterly data on a 
few key macroeconomic variables from 1962:Q1 
through 2008:Q4.4
Specifically, our analysis accomplishes three  
objectives. First, we describe the historical evolution 
of the equilibrium RIR. We find that this rate has 
been negative at times, particularly in the late 1970s 
and, most interestingly, during the latest recession. 
Second, we estimate the short-term RIR gap as 
the difference between the current (as opposed to fu-
ture) ex ante RIR and the equilibrium RIR. This pro-
vides some indication of the stance of monetary policy. 
Consistent with the anecdotal view, the estimated short-
term RIR gap suggests that policy was loose during 
most of the 1970s. In contrast, policy would seem to 
have been tight at the end of our sample. However, 
this mostly reflects the zero bound problem—policy-
makers’ inability to lower short-term nominal interest 
rates below zero—and provides a rationale for the 
nonconventional policy measures undertaken by the 
Federal Reserve during the most recent recession, such 
as direct purchases of longer-term securities and the 
creation of special facilities and programs (for example, 
the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, or 
TALF) intended to increase access to credit. 
Finally, we compare the evolution of the short-
term and long-term RIR gaps, where the latter is de-
fined as the sum of the current and expected future 
short-term RIR gaps or, alternatively, the difference 
between the ex ante long-term RIR and the equilibrium 
long-term RIR. Long-term rates reflect the path of 
current and expected future short-term rates. There-
fore, long-term gaps summarize private expectations 
about future macroeconomic outcomes and monetary 
policy, providing a more forward-looking measure of 
the policy stance. For instance, according to this mea-
sure, policy was not loose in the 2002–06 period, which 
preceded the recent economic downturn. This charac-
terization of the policy stance contrasts with what is 
suggested by the short-term RIR gap and, in particular, 
with the view of several commentators (see, for in-
stance, Taylor, 2007). 
Several papers have tackled the estimation of the 
equilibrium RIR before, most notably Laubach and 
Williams (2003) and Kozicki and Clark (2005). In con-
trast to these earlier studies, our estimate of the equi-
librium RIR is based on a micro-founded model, which 
builds on the optimizing behavior of households and 
firms seeking to maximize their utility and profits. In 
this respect, this article is related to the approach of 
Neiss and Nelson (2003), Amisano and Tristani (2008), 
and, in particular, Edge, Kiley, and Laforte (2008). How-
ever, in contrast to these earlier studies, we stress the 
importance of both current and expected future RIR 
gaps for the determination of macroeconomic outcomes. 
As with all empirical work based on structural 
models, our results may be sensitive to some aspects 
of the model specification. To illustrate this point, we 
compare our results across two models that differ in 
scale, shocks, and transmission mechanisms of these 
disturbances. 
The article is organized as follows. First, we pro-
vide a brief description of our baseline model economy. 
Then, we describe the data and the estimation approach. 
Next, we present the main results—that is, we present 
our estimates of the equilibrium RIR and RIR gaps. We 
also discuss the robustness of these estimates when 
inferred from a larger-scale model. We conclude with 
a few comments and caveats to our analysis, particu-
larly with regard to the current economic situation. 
More specifically, we note how the larger-scale model 
also suggests the presence of positive short-term and 
long-term RIR gaps for the fourth quarter of 2008. This 
provides a further rationale for the Federal Reserve’s 
response to the current crisis with nonconventional mea-
sures to ease monetary policy. We do, however, em-
phasize the need to enhance these models’ ability to 
capture the interplay between the financial sector and 
the real economy, particularly in light of recent events. 
The model
In this section, we sketch our baseline new 
Keynesian model and analyze two of its key equilib-
rium relations—the aggregate demand and supply 16 1Q/2010, Economic Perspectives
equations. The presentation is mostly narrative, with 
most of the technical details relegated to the appendix. 
Interested readers can refer to Justiniano and Primiceri 
(2008) for greater details on the model, or they can 
see the comprehensive treatment of new Keynesian 
models in Woodford (2003) and Galí (2008), as well 
as the excellent primer by Galí and Gertler (2007). For 
simplicity, relative to Justiniano and Primiceri (2008), 
the model here abstracts from the roles of habit forma-
tion, indexation, and endogenous capital accumulation. 
We present the results based on a larger-scale model 
with these additional features as a robustness check  
in a later section. 
There are five types of agents in our model econ-
omy: 1) households, 2) employment agencies, 3) firms 
producing intermediate goods, 4) firms producing final 
goods, and 5) the monetary authority. We now briefly 
describe the behavior of each of them. 
Households 
We assume that we have a large number of house-
holds seeking to maximize their stream of current and 
expected future utility, which depends positively on 
their consumption of a single final good and negatively 
on the number of hours they work for the production 
of intermediate goods. Each household is the sole sup-
plier of a specialized type of labor that it sells to the 
employment agencies in exchange for wages. Rather 
than taking wages as given—as under the neoclassi-
cal assumption of perfect competition—each house-
hold has some market power and can post its wage. 
This, in turn, determines the amount of their special-
ized labor demanded by the employment agencies. 
We introduce sticky wages in the labor market  
by assuming that at each point in time only a random 
fraction of households can change their posted wage. 
Hence, when setting its wage, each household takes 
into consideration not only current but also future  
labor demand and costs of working. For example, if 
future labor demand is expected to rise, households 
will preemptively post higher wages, since they 
might not be able to do so in the near future. 
Finally, all households have access to savings 
through two types of assets: one-period government 
bonds and state-contingent securities, which pay only 
if a certain future state is realized. The former are used 
to smooth consumption over time. State-contingent secu-
rities serve instead to insure against the idiosyncratic 
risk arising from the uncertainty about the length of time 
before households will be able to reset their wages. 
Employment agencies
Employment agencies mediate the demand  
and supply of labor between households and firms 
producing intermediate goods. Their role is to purchase 
all types of specialized labor supplied by households 
and bundle them into a single homogenous labor in-
put sold to intermediate goods firms. Employment 
agencies operate in a perfectly competitive market, 
taking the wage received for the labor bundle as given 
and making zero profits. 
Intermediate goods producers
A large number of intermediate goods producers 
combine technology with labor inputs purchased from 
employment agencies to produce differentiated inter-
mediate goods, which are then sold to final goods 
producers. Each of the intermediate goods producers 
has some market power and can therefore post the 
price of its good. This, in turn, determines the amount 
of its output demanded by the final goods producers. 
We introduce sticky prices in the goods market 
by assuming that at each point in time only a random 
fraction of firms can change their posted price. Hence, 
when setting its price, each firm takes into consideration 
not only current but also future demand and marginal 
costs, where the latter depend on wages. For example, 
if future demand is expected to rise, producers will 
preemptively increase prices, since they might not  
be able to adjust them in the near future. 
Final goods producers
Final goods producers mediate between interme-
diate goods producers and households. They produce 
the final good by bundling all intermediate goods into 
a single final homogenous commodity purchased by 
households. Final goods firms maximize profits as well, 
but in contrast to the intermediate goods producers, 
they operate under perfect competition, taking the price 
for the final good as given and making zero profits. 
Monetary authority
The central bank determines monetary policy by 
setting the short-term nominal interest rate in response 
to price inflation and output growth. This interest rate 
rule is a variant of the instrument rule proposed by 
Taylor (1993), the Taylor rule, which approximates 
the historical behavior of the U.S. federal funds rate. 
According to this rule, nominal interest rates rise 
more than one-to-one with inflation and fall in re-
sponse to output contractions. 
Demand, supply, and the equilibrium RIR
Before presenting our estimation results, we 
highlight the main insights of the two crucial equilib-
rium relations in the model. This helps explain the 
roles of the equilibrium RIR and RIR gaps in the  
determination of output and inflation. 17 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Aggregate demand
In the model, aggregate spending is determined 
by the behavior of the representative household, which 
seeks to smooth consumption over time by investing 
its savings in one-period government bonds. This  
optimizing behavior results in the following (log- 
linearized) aggregate demand equation, which is 
also known as the IS equation:
1)  y E y r t t t t = − +1 ,
∧ ∧ ∧  
where yt and rt are output and the RIR, respectively, 
and the hat symbol (
∧) denotes deviations from the 
equilibrium level. Hence, yt
∧  denotes the output gap, 
and rt
∧ stands for the short-term RIR gap. Intuitively, 
according to the aggregate demand equation, fluctua-
tions in the short-term RIR gap induce deviations of 
the output gap from its expected future value, E y t t+1,
∧
 
where the operator Et denotes households’ expecta-
tion of future values conditional on the information 
available today. 
Equation 1 can be iterated forward to express the 
output gap today only as a function of the current and 
expected future short-term RIR gaps. This procedure 
yields the expression









by which the output gap is negatively associated  
with the long-term RIR gap. The latter corresponds  
to the sum of current and expected future short-term 
RIR gaps.5 Notice, therefore, that if the long-run RIR 
gap is negative, the output gap will be positive, and 
vice versa. 
Aggregate supply
In terms of the supply side, intermediate goods 
firms set prices according to the current and expected 
future evolution of marginal costs and demand condi-
tions. Profit-maximizing behavior results in the fol-
lowing (log-linearized) aggregate supply or Phillips 
curve equation:
3)  πt = βEt πt+1 + κst + λπ,t,
where πt and st stand for price inflation and real mar-
ginal costs, respectively, and λπ,t is a markup shock 
that represents exogenous variation to the level of mark-
up desired by intermediate goods producers. Finally, 
β is a constant very close to one that represents the 
temporal discount factor, and κ is a positive constant 
that is inversely related to the degree of price sticki-
ness. Intuitively, inflation exceeds its expected future 
level either if real marginal costs increase or if inter-
mediate goods firms change their desired markup of 
prices over marginal costs for other reasons exogenous 
to the model. 
To highlight the importance of the RIR gap for 
inflation determination, we briefly analyze a special 
case of our model obtained by assuming perfectly 
flexible wages. Under this assumption, real marginal 
costs are proportional to the output gap. Hence, all 
else being equal, a positive output gap will cause in-
flation to rise relative to its expected future level. More-
over, if the output gap is projected to remain positive 
in the future, expected future inflation will also increase, 
further fueling the rise in current inflation. That is, cur-
rent and expected future RIR gaps engender pressures 
on prices through their effects on aggregate demand. 
This crucial insight also holds in our general model 
with wage rigidities, although with sticky wages the 
link between the output gap and real marginal costs  
is more complex. 
RIR gaps and monetary policy
Equations 1 and 3 highlight the importance of RIR 
gaps for output and inflation determination. Current 
and future expected deviations of ex ante RIRs from 
their corresponding equilibrium values affect the out-
put gap, which, in turn, influences the inflation rate. 
Since the ex ante RIRs depend on the nominal interest 
rates set by the monetary authority, the conduct of 
monetary policy is central to the behavior of the RIR 
gaps and, hence, output and inflation. 
Consider, for instance, a central bank that seeks 
to stabilize price inflation and the output gap. Absent 
any markup shocks (λπ,t), the central bank can achieve 
full stabilization of both output and inflation by com-
mitting to set nominal interest rates according to an 
appropriate instrument rule that delivers a zero RIR 
gap at every point in time. 
However, as we mentioned in the introduction, 
tracking the equilibrium RIR may not be feasible when 
the zero bound on nominal interest rates becomes bind-
ing. Put another way, sometimes the equilibrium RIR 
may fall enough that, even with the short-term nominal 
interest rate at zero, positive RIR gaps would emerge. 
In this case, according to the model, output would  
decline relative to potential and inflation would fall. 
Even abstracting from the zero bound, in practice 
optimal monetary policy is more involved than the 
simple prescription of tracking the equilibrium RIR. 
This is due to the fact that markup shocks bring about 
a trade-off between stabilizing the output gap and in-
flation.6 Nonetheless, despite these considerations, 18 1Q/2010, Economic Perspectives
the equilibrium RIR remains an important reference 
point for the conduct of monetary policy, assuming 
that it can be accurately estimated and forecasted. 
This is the task we undertake next. 
Model solution and estimation
In this section, we provide a brief overview of 
the approach that we adopt to estimate the model’s 
parameters and to infer the evolution of the latent 
(unobservable) variables. The discussion is somewhat 
technical, although we do not aim to provide a com-
prehensive overview of the techniques we used. For 
more details on these techniques, interested readers 
should refer to An and Schorfheide (2007).
Model solution and state-space representation
The model we described in the preceding section 
has a solution of the form 
4) 
t t t G M    ξ θ ξ θ ε = ( ) + ( ) ,
−1
where the state vector 
t  x collects all variables except 
for the shocks. The elements of  t  x are expressed in 
(log) deviations from the model’s nonstochastic steady 
state, which corresponds to the constant values of all 
variables that the economy would converge to in the 
absence of shocks. The shocks inducing temporary 
deviations from the steady state are stacked in the 
vector  t.  ε Meanwhile, G (θ) and M (θ) are matrices 
whose elements are functions of the vector of model 
structural parameters, denoted by θ. Our goal is to es-
timate these parameters and to uncover the historical 
behavior of the unobserved variables in the state vector. 
In fact, while some elements of the state vector are 
directly observed in the data (for instance, inflation and 
output), others are not (such as the equilibrium RIR 
and expected inflation). Therefore, in order to esti-
mate the model, equation 4 must be combined with an 
additional set of equations specifying which elements 
of the state vector are observed in the data. 
The general form of this additional set of equa-
tions is 
5)   x Z C t t = + ( ) θ ( ) , ￿ ξ
where Z is a matrix mapping the elements of   x into 
xt (the vector of observable data) and where C is a 
vector of constant terms (which may depend on θ) 
representing the steady state of the observable elements 
of   x. Equations 4 and 5 constitute the transition and 
measurement equations of a linear state-space model. 
Data
We estimate the model, using five series of U.S. 
quarterly data: 1) real per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP), 2) per capita hours worked, 3) real per capita 
wages, 4) quarterly inflation, and 5) the short-term 
nominal interest rate. We construct real GDP by dividing 
nominal GDP by the population aged 22–65 and the 
GDP deflator.7 For hours, we use a measure of hours 
in all sectors of the economy following Francis and 
Ramey (2008). This is also our source for the popula-
tion series. Real wages correspond to nominal compensa-
tion of employees from the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis’s national income and product accounts  
(NIPAs), divided by hours and the GDP deflator; for 
the nominal interest rates, we use the effective federal 
funds rate. The sample period spans 1962:Q1 through 
2008:Q4.8 We do not de-mean or de-trend any series.
Bayesian inference
The state-space representation of the model allows 
us to use a very powerful algorithm known as the Kalman 
filter to estimate the parameters θ and retrieve the most 
likely path of the unobservable elements of  t  x. We 
discuss each in turn. 
A natural way to estimate the model is to find the 
value of the parameters θ that maximizes the likelihood 
function. The likelihood function summarizes all in-
formation about θ contained in a sample of data and 
plays a pivotal role in econometrics and statistics. The 
likelihood function of our state-space model can be 
evaluated using the Kalman filter. 
In practice, however, the likelihood function  
associated with most modern macroeconomic models 
is typically a complicated nonlinear function of the 
model parameters. This makes finding a unique value 
that maximizes the likelihood a rather arduous task. 
For this reason, most of the recent literature estimating 
macro models has turned to Bayesian methods, which 
discipline the set of plausible values for θ through the 
use of prior information. 
Bayesian inference then seeks to characterize the 
distribution of θ that results from combining the like-
lihood function with the prior information. This is known 
as the posterior distribution, from which we can com-
pute the location of a parameter (mean or median) 
and a measure of uncertainty. For instance, the uncer-
tainty surrounding θ can be conveyed by reporting 
posterior probability bands that contain the range of 
values that parameters are likely to take with, say,  
99 percent probability. 
Prior beliefs about the elements of θ may be in-
formed by theory or simply reflect and summarize  19 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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Note: The dashed lines are the 99 percent posterior probability bands.
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from Haver Analytics and  
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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information not contained in the estimation sample. 
In practice, this prior information is formulated by 
specifying a certain distribution for each element of 
the parameter vector, centered at a particular value 
(mean) and with an associated measure of uncertainty 
(standard deviation). 
Once we have estimated the model’s parameters, 
we can employ the Kalman filter to sequentially and 
systematically update our guess for the unobserved 
elements of the state vector. More precisely, at each 
point in time, our guess for  t  x , based on data avail-
able in the previous quarter, is updated after we ob-
serve the data for the current period. This filtered 
(or one-sided) estimate for the state vector forms the 
basis for our guess on the value of the state vector 
next period, which we also update once we have data 
for the next quarter, and so on. 
Having followed this procedure for all periods, 
we can go back and revise the filtered estimate of 
t  x , 
conditional not only on information up to time t but 
also on the whole sample of data. We call the state 
vector emerging from this procedure the smoothed 
(or two-sided) estimate. We analyze these estimates 
in the next section. 
Equilibrium RIR and RIR gaps  
in the estimated model
We do not report the estimated parameters in this 
article. They are similar to those of Justiniano and 
Primiceri (2008), who use a longer sample. Here, we 
focus on our estimates of the equilibrium 
RIR and the RIR gaps. 
The equilibrium RIR
Figure 1 plots the smoothed estimate 
of the equilibrium RIR (solid blue line). 
It is also important to characterize the  
uncertainty surrounding the estimated 
equilibrium RIR, particularly since this  
is cited as a possible concern regarding 
its usefulness for monetary policy analy-
sis. Therefore, we also report uncertainty 
bands (dashed black lines), which repre-
sent the values this variable is likely to 
have taken with 99 percent probability. 
We first highlight a few properties of the 
smoothed estimate and later discuss  
these probability bands. 
The first thing to notice is that the  
inferred equilibrium RIR has fluctuated 
substantially over our sample, with a 
standard deviation of 1.94 percent around 
a mean of 2.6 percent (annualized).9
A second interesting feature of figure 1 is that the 
equilibrium RIR has turned negative in a few instances. 
This occurred around 1975 and the end of 2008—two 
recession dates, as determined by the National Bureau of 
Economic Research—and during the 2003–04 period. 
These episodes were characterized by a substantial 
decline in the federal funds rate in response to weak 
economic conditions. However, the 2008 episode is 
the only one in our sample for which the uncertainty 
bands are completely below zero. 
Indeed, the third interesting observation is that 
the equilibrium RIR has plummeted in the latest part 
of the sample. In particular, during the latest recession, 
the equilibrium RIR seems to have recorded by far its 
largest decline, with an estimate for 2008:Q4 of roughly 
–2.15 percent. 
The tightness of the posterior probability bands 
deserves some comment. In particular, the precision 
with which the equilibrium RIR is estimated perhaps 
seems implausible, especially considering that these 
bands account for the uncertainty surrounding both 
the unobserved states and the model parameters. It is 
important to keep in mind, however, that these proba-
bility bands abstract from model uncertainty. That is, 
alternative specifications of the model (for example, a 
different historical characterization of U.S. monetary 
policy or a model with additional propagation mecha-
nisms and/or shocks) might deliver different esti-
mates of the equilibrium RIR. We return to this issue 
in the section explaining the larger-scale model. 20 1Q/2010, Economic Perspectives
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This being said, the cross-sectional 
dispersion at different points in time is 
larger than perhaps suggested visually by 
figure 1. For example, figure 2 plots the 
posterior distribution of the equilibrium 
RIR for the last point in the sample, 
2008:Q4. Values of the equilibrium RIR 
are on the horizontal axis, with the verti-
cal line drawn at the median of –2.15 
percent, which coincides with the esti-
mate reported in the previous figure.  
Notice that this distribution has a range 
from roughly –4 percent to –0.5 percent, 
with hardly any weight assigned to val-
ues close to zero. Therefore, our model-
based estimates suggest that it is quite 
likely that the equilibrium RIR became 
negative in 2008. To what extent did this 
induce positive RIR gaps? We address 
this key issue next. 
The short-term RIR gap
The ex ante RIR is given by the dif-
ference between the nominal interest rate 
and the inflation rate expected for next 
quarter. While the former is directly ob-
servable in our data, the latter is part of 
the unobservable state vector and must 
be backed out using the Kalman filter. 
Figure 3 shows the smoothed esti-
mate of the ex ante RIR (blue line) to-
gether with the equilibrium RIR (black 
line). The mean of the ex ante RIR is 
2.37 percent (annualized) with a standard 
deviation of 2.45 percent. These statistics 
are similar to those corresponding to the 
equilibrium RIR. The overall contours of 
these two series coincide, although they 
have differed at times. 
In order to highlight the discrepan-
cies between the ex ante RIR and the 
equilibrium RIR, figure 4 plots their dif-
ference together with its 99 percent prob-
ability bands. We refer to this difference 
as the short-term RIR gap, in order to 
distinguish it from the long-term gap that 
we analyze next. Note that the short-term 
gap has also fluctuated considerably over 
time, with an average of –0.33 percent 
and a standard deviation of 1.28 percent. 
As we noted earlier, the short-term 
RIR gap is commonly taken as a measure 
of the monetary policy stance. And indeed, 
FIguRE 3
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from Haver Analytics and  
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at least for some episodes, the evolution of the RIR 
gap aligns well with the anecdotal characterization of 
monetary policy that we see in the literature. For in-
stance, according to our estimates, the equilibrium RIR 
exceeded the ex ante real interest rate during most of 
the 1970s, exactly when U.S. inflation was at histori-
cally high levels. This is consistent with the view that 
monetary policy during this period was characterized 
by an insufficient response to the rise in inflation (Clarida, 
Galí, and Gertler, 2000). Similarly, the significant in-
crease in the short-term RIR gap in the early 1980s 
accords well with the conventional view that the disin-
flation in the U.S. economy was engineered by a sub-
stantial policy tightening under then-Federal Reserve 
Chairman Paul Volcker. 
The long-term RIR gap
While the behavior of the short-term RIR gap pre-
sented in figure 4 squares quite well with the convention-
al view, there are a few caveats that call for caution in 
interpreting this gap as a good proxy for the stance of 
monetary policy. In particular, as we explained earlier, 
it is important to recognize that the whole path of ex-
pected future short-term RIR gaps—rather than just its 
contemporaneous value—matters for the determination 
of output and inflation in the new Keynesian model (see 
equation 2, p. 17). From this perspective, we might judge 
the monetary policy stance better by looking at the long-
term RIR gap, which summarizes the information con-
tained in the current and expected future values of the 
federal funds rate, inflation, and the equilibrium RIR. 
To this end, figure 5 compares the 
short-term RIR gap (blue line) with the 
evolution of the long-term one (black 
line). Although the two series often move 
together—the correlation coefficient is 
equal to 0.56—the message about the 
stance of monetary policy implied by  
the two lines differs during some his-
torical episodes. 
The 2002–06 period provides an in-
teresting example. In 2002:Q3 the federal 
funds rate stood at 1.75 percent, but it had 
declined to 1 percent by 2003:Q3, and re-
mained there for the next three quarters. 
The federal funds rate then rose gradually, 
reaching 5.25 percent in 2006:Q3. Some 
have argued that monetary policy was  
too accommodative during this period 
(for example, Taylor, 2007). Although  
the negative value of the short-term RIR  
gap seems to accord with this claim (blue 
line), the positive value of the long-term 
RIR gap (black line) does not support the 
view that policy was too expansionary. In particular, 
it suggests that the private sector expected a decline 
of the equilibrium RIR or a monetary tightening. 
The difference between short-term and long-term 
gaps toward the end of the sample is also informative. 
For instance, our estimate of the short-term RIR gap 
in 2008:Q4 is roughly 1.5 percent. This suggests that, 
according to the model, the federal funds rate of 0.5 
percent was probably above the equilibrium RIR. Fur-
thermore, it suggests that the zero bound on nominal 
interest rates would have been binding before addi-
tional interest rate cuts could have closed the short-
term RIR gap. In addition, the estimated long-term 
RIR gap exceeds 3 percent. Taken at face value, this 
would suggest that at the end of 2008, positive short-
term gaps were expected to persist and the zero 
bound was expected to bind beyond a single quarter. 
Before we interpret this result as indicative of 
contractionary monetary policy, we must acknowl-
edge that these gaps can only reflect the stance of 
conventional monetary policy. By this we mean the 
Federal Reserve’s management of the short-term 
nominal interest rate. During the current economic 
crisis, the Federal Reserve has also employed a vari-
ety of nonconventional policy measures; and these 
measures have been reflected in the changing size and 
composition of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. 
Our simple analysis suggests that these measures 
have been appropriate, insofar as both the short-term 
RIR and long-term RIR exceeded the equilibrium 22 1Q/2010, Economic Perspectives
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Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from Haver Analytics and  
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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RIR. However, these extraordinary mea-
sures are not reflected in our analysis of 
the short-term and long-term RIR gaps. 
A larger-scale model
The baseline model can be summa-
rized in a few simple equations that, as 
discussed, clearly highlight the role of 
the equilibrium RIR for the dynamics  
of output and inflation. This simplicity, 
however, comes at the expense of ab-
stracting from other features that impart 
more realism to the model. In particular, 
additional shocks can be included and 
other mechanisms added (such as  
endogenous capital accumulation) 
through which disturbances influence  
the evolution of the economy. For this 
reason, we test the robustness of our 
main conclusions by using a larger-scale 
model estimated on a richer data set.  
This extended model is discussed in  
Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) and  
is based on the well-known studies of 
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 
(2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007).
Relative to our baseline model, the larger-scale 
model includes the additional propagation mecha-
nisms provided by endogenous capital accumulation, 
investment adjustment costs, a choice of capital utili-
zation, habit formation in consumption, and index-
ation in both prices and wages. These features are 
essentially meant to increase the length of time for 
which a given shock will affect the evolution of the 
economy. There are three additional disturbances per-
turbing the model economy, specifically, shocks to the 
marginal efficiency of investment, to the disutility of 
labor, and to government spending. Finally, we esti-
mate the model over the same sample, 1962:Q1 through 
2008:Q4, but we incorporate additional data on con-
sumption and investment. 
Figure 6 reports the smoothed estimates of the 
equilibrium RIR and the ex ante RIR, as well as the 
short-term and long-term RIR gaps. In each panel,  
the black line reproduces the estimates from the base-
line model and the blue line corresponds to estimates 
from the extended model. 
Panel A highlights the fact that the cyclical pat-
tern of the equilibrium RIR is very similar across models, 
although the equilibrium RIR is substantially more 
volatile in the larger-scale model.10 One implication 
of this finding is that, according to the extended model, 
the equilibrium RIR has declined below zero more 
frequently than what is predicted by our baseline frame-
work. Furthermore, the decline in the current down-
turn, while substantial, is not as dramatic by historical 
standards as suggested by the baseline model. 
Since the inferred ex ante RIR (panel B) is almost 
identical across models, it is not surprising that the 
short-term RIR gap (panel C) and long-term RIR gap 
(panel D) are more volatile in the larger-scale model as 
well. Notice also that the estimates from our baseline 
model and larger-scale model co-move more closely in 
the case of the long-term gap, for which the two lines 
essentially overlap during the latest part of the sample. 
Regarding the 2002–06 period, the discrepancy 
between the short-term and long-term RIR gaps is far 
less evident in the larger-scale model than in our 
baseline model. However, both measures in the larger-
scale model remain positive or very close to zero. 
This confirms our earlier observation that policy may 
not have been as accommodative during this period 
as has been suggested (for example, Taylor, 2007). 
Consistent with the baseline model, the larger-scale 
framework also predicts large positive short-term and 
long-term RIR gaps for the fourth quarter of 2008. 
However, the same caveats we raised earlier about in-
terpreting these endpoint estimates as reflecting the 
policy stance apply to the larger-scale model as well. 23 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from Haver Analytics and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Overall, despite some obvious discrepancies, we 
view these results as an important assessment of robust-
ness of our main findings. Furthermore, they suggest—
in line with our  earlier hypothesis—that model 
uncertainty is likely to be a crucial factor surrounding 
the measurement of the unobservable equilibrium RIR 
and related components. This source of uncertainty is 
sometimes ignored in studies presenting model-based 
estimates of the RIR, although our findings suggest 
that this should be a major issue for further empirical 
work in this area. 
Conclusion
In this article, we study the evolution of the equi-
librium RIR and RIR gaps, using both a prototypical 
new Keynesian model and a larger-scale model simi-
lar to those in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) 
and Smets and Wouters (2007). Our estimates point to 
a substantial degree of time variation in the equilibri-
um RIR. Moreover, we find that this rate has sometimes 
become negative in the post-war period. In particular, 
our analysis suggests that the equilibrium RIR fell 
sharply below zero toward the end of 2008 (although 24 1Q/2010, Economic Perspectives
the magnitude of this decline relative to historical 
standards is model dependent), resulting in positive 
short-term and long-term expected RIR gaps. This pro-
vides some support for the Federal Reserve’s response 
to the current crisis with nonconventional measures 
to ease monetary policy.
We conclude by noting that the models we use 
here, even the larger-scale one, are to some extent 
very stylized and have some shortcomings. One of 
these shortcomings is the absence of an explicit theo-
retical framework of the financial sector and financial 
frictions. It would be useful to analyze how the intro-
duction of these additional features would affect our 
results (as, for instance, in Christiano, Motto, and 
Rostagno, 2007). These features seem particularly 
relevant for the analysis of current economic events.
NOTES 
1Hence, we could alternatively refer to the equilibrium real interest 
rate as the real interest rate at potential. We prefer the former ter-
minology because it is more popular in the literature and policy 
discussions, as exemplified by the discussion in Ferguson (2004). 
Meanwhile, potential output is proportional, but lower than the  
efficient level of output. The efficient level of output is the level  
of output under perfect competition and, therefore, with zero mark-
ups. In the goods market, the markup is defined as the amount by 
which prices exceed the marginal cost of production. In the labor 
market, the markup is defined as the excess of wages over the mar-
ginal cost of supplying labor. 
2Exogenous variations in desired markups, usually referred to as 
markup shocks, introduce such a trade-off (see, for example, 
Clarida, Galí, and Gertler, 1999). 
3Potential output is not directly observable either, and the policy 
implications of its measurement have received substantial attention 
following the work of Orphanides (2001). See also Justiniano and 
Primiceri (2008).
4We also estimate the model’s unknown parameters and subse-
quently extract all unobserved model-based variables, such as  
expected inflation next period. 
5While seemingly daunting to compute, the long-run rates can 
be backed out from the Lagrange multiplier of the household’s 
budget constraint. 
6If wages are rigid, optimal monetary policy must attribute some 
weight to wage inflation stabilization as well.
7All data except for hours are from Haver Analytics. We are very 
grateful to Shawn Sprague, of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
for providing us the series of hours in all sectors of the economy.
8We use the eight years prior to the sample period to initialize the 
Kalman filter.
9This result is consistent with the large degree of time variation 
reported by Laubach and Williams (2003) and Edge, Kiley, and 
Laforte (2008), but stands in contrast to the analysis of Neiss and 
Nelson (2003), who argue that the equilibrium real interest rate  
exhibits very little volatility.
10The main reason the equilibrium RIR in the larger-scale model 
is more volatile is that this model includes habit formation.25 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
APPENDIx: MODEL EQUATIONS 
We present the main equations of the model for each 
of the five classes of agents described in the main text. 
Households
The expected discounted stream of utility that 
each household j maximizes is given by 




























where Ct denotes consumption, and the second argu-
ment of the utility function represents the marginal dis-
utility of each household’s specific labor, L(j), that de-
pends on the parameter v, known as the inverse Frisch 
elasticity of labor supply. Future utility is discounted 
at the rate β, and bt is a “discount factor” shock af-
fecting both the marginal utility of consumption and 
the marginal disutility of labor. The logarithm of bt 
is modeled as a Gaussian autoregressive process of 
order 1, denoted as AR(1) for short. 
At every point in time t, each household’s sources 
and uses of income must be equal, as summarized by 
the budget constraint
PtCt + Tt + Bt ≤ Rt–1Bt–1 + Qt–1(j) + ∏t + Wt    (j)Lt(j), 
where Tt is lump-sum taxes and transfers, Bt denotes 
holdings of government bonds, Rt is the gross nominal 
interest rate, Qt(j) is the net cash flow from participating 
in state-contingent securities that insure against idio-
syncratic risk, and ∏t is the per capita profit that house-
holds get from owning the intermediate goods firms. 
Following Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), 
we permit in every period only a fraction 1 – ξw of house-
holds to reset their wages to minimize the expected dis-
counted stream of labor disutility for the periods in 




























This is subject to the labor demand function of em-
ployment agencies specified next. Wages for the re-
maining ξw fraction of households are indexed to 
steady-state inflation and productivity. 
Employment agencies
Competitive employment agencies operate in 
competitive markets and bundle each household’s 
specialized labor Lt (j) into a homogenous labor 
input according to
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Homogeneous labor is sold to intermediate goods 
firms. Profit maximization and the zero profit condi-
























where Wt           (  j) is the wage paid by the employment 
agencies to the household supplying labor of type j, 
and Wt  is the hourly wage paid by intermediate goods 
firms for their homogenous labor input. The demand 
schedule for labor j is decreasing in the relative wage 
and depends on the elasticity of substitution among 
varieties of labor given by Λw,t . Notice that this elas-
ticity is time varying, and we assume that log (1+ Λw,t    ) 
is a Gaussian independent and identically distributed 
(i.i.d.) process. In the literature this is referred to as 
the wage markup shock, and it is analyzed in detail in 
Justiniano and Primiceri (2008). 
Intermediate goods producers
A monopolistically competitive firm produces 
the intermediate good Yt(i) with the production function
 
Yt(i) = At   Lt(i)a ,
where Lt (i) denotes the bundled labor input purchased 
from employment agencies for the production of good i, 
and At represents a productivity shock. We model At 
as nonstationary, with its growth rate following a 
Gaussian AR(1) process. 
As in Calvo (1983), at each point in time a fraction 
ξp of firms cannot reoptimize their prices and index them 
to steady-state inflation. The remaining fraction 1 – ξp 
of firms post a new price  t P i ￿ ( ) to maximize the ex-
pected discounted stream of profits for the periods in 
which the new price is anticipated to remain in place, 26 1Q/2010, Economic Perspectives
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where Λt+s is the marginal utility of consumption used 
to value future income, subject to the goods demand 
function specified in the next section. 
Final goods producers
Perfectly competitive firms produce the final good 
Yt by bundling all intermediate goods according to
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Profit maximization and zero profit condition for the 
final goods producers imply the following demand 
























where Pt corresponds to the aggregate price level. The 
demand schedule for intermediate good i is decreasing 
in its relative price, and depends on the elasticity of 
substitution Λp,t among varieties of intermediate goods. 
This elasticity is time varying, and we assume that 
log (1+ Λp,t  ) is a Gaussian i.i.d. process. This 
disturbance is known as the price markup shock. 
Monetary authority
The Taylor type rule for the short-term nominal 
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R t ε ,
with R being the steady state for the gross nominal 
interest rate and εR,t being a Gaussian i.i.d. monetary 
policy shock. The parameters φπ and φY capture how 
aggressively the monetary authority responds to vari-
ations in inflation and output growth over the current 
and previous three quarters. There is a time-varying 
inflation target πt
∗, which evolves exogenously according 
to a Gaussian AR(1) process. Finally, notice that short-
term nominal interest rates are adjusted gradually, as 
given by ρR, referred to as the smoothing coefficient. 27 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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